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The Eleventh Amendment Yields
Recent court decisions upholding congressional authority to regulate certain
state activities under the commerce clause,' even to the avoidance of the
constitutional protection of the eleventh amendment,' open new horizons for
federal control over the states. The eleventh amendment confers upon the states
the right to invoke the defense of governmental immunity in suits against them
by citizens of another state or citizens of a foreign country. This article will
discuss a number of decisions which have led to the subrogation of the states'
eleventh amendment immunity and the effect of these decisions on proposed
federal legislation.
It has only been in recent years that state immunity to suit in federal courts
has received a serious challenge.3 Recently our states have entered new areas
of activity previously confined to private enterprise. Simultaneously, the scope
I. The commerce clause reads: "The Congress shall have the Power . . . To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S.
CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
2. The eleventh amendment reads: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
U.S. CONST. amend. XL.
3. The rule that "the king can do no wrong," or as more precisely stated, "The king cannot
be sued in his own courts unless he first consents," was well established in England and was adopted
into the American system of law with the rest of the English Common Law. The states claimed
that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was necessary for the effective administration of their
laws. Mr. Justice Holmes explained the doctrine by stating that "there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends." Kawanankoa v. Polyblank,
205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907). The most satisfactory justification for state sovereign immunity appears
to be the protection provided state revenues, as expounded in I E. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT
IN UNITED STATEs HISTORY 91-102 (1922). Over the years, however, what was once a general
immunity doctrine has been systematically reduced by courts and legislatures, See, e.g., Colorado
Racing Comm'n v. Brush Racing Ass'n, 136 Colo. 279, 316 P.2d 582 (1957); Hargrove v. Town
of Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1957); Molitor v. Kaneland Community Dist. No. 302, 18
lll.2d II, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959). "Only the vestigial remains of such governmental immunity have
survived; its requiem has long been foreshadowed. For years the process of erosion of governmen-
tal immunity has gone on unabated. The Legislature has contributed mightly to that erosion. The
courts, by distinction and extension, have removed much of the force of the rule." Muskopf v.
Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal.2d 211, 221, 359 P.2d 457, 463, II Cal. Rptr. 89, 95 (1961). The late
Supreme Court Justice Frankfurter, noting the "chilly feeling against sovereign immunity," ob-
served for the court that "even the immunity enjoyed by the United States as territorial sovereign
is a legal doctrine which has not been favored by the test of time. It has increasingly been found to
be in conflict with the growing subjection of governmental action to the moral judgment." Nat'l
Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 359 (1955). Only in suits by individuals against a state
in federal court has the immunity doctrine retained any of its former effect. That vitality is eroding
with greater difficulty because of its constitutional basis.
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of federal regulations has increased in these same areas. It was inevitable that
at some time these two converging forces would conflict. Where these state-
federal conflicts have occurred, infringement upon state sovereignty has
resulted. The courts have slowly eroded one of the obstacles to this increased
federal control by avoiding the state immunity provided by the eleventh
amendment." The wording of the eleventh amendment explicitly protects states
from being sued in federal courts by citizens of other states or by citizens of
foreign countries; it does not expressly exempt them from suits by their own
citizens, but it has been interpreted to extend to such situations. Throughout
this article the authors will consider the eleventh amendment as including this
extension. The discussion injra as to the courts' subrogation of the eleventh
amendment could alternatively be directed toward a sub silentio overruling of
this same extension.
The commerce clause is the vehicle used by the courts to avoid the states'
eleventh amendment immunity. Ever since the first case involving the commerce
clause, Gibbons v. Ogden,' the Supreme Court and Congress have used that
clause to exert increasing control over activities previously regulated by the
states. In Gibbons Chief Justice Marshall, in discussing the limits of the
commerce clause, said that the power of Congress over interstate commerce
"is complete in itself . . . . [It] may be exercised to its utmost extent and
acknowledges no limitations other than those proscribed in the Constitution." 7
Using this language as the foundation of its power, Congress has expanded
its involvement into many areas, including navigation,' railroads,, labor, 0
4. The eleventh amendment was quickly proposed and ratified in 1793 to legislatively overrule
the action of the Supreme Court in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)419 (1793). In Chisholm,
the Court held that its own jurisdiction extended to a suit against the state of Georgia by two
South Carolina citizens. The eleventh amendment was adopted to ensure that the states retained
their protection from suit in federal courts. See Mathis, The Eleventh Amendment: Adoption and
Interpretation, 2 GA. L. REv. 207 (1968).
5. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. I (1890). Hans held that federal courts do not have jurisdiction
over a suit against an unconsenting state brought by that state's own citizen. The Supreme Court
did not expressly state its decision was based on the eleventh amendment. Id. at 15. However,
subsequent cases have consistently considered Hans as an extension of the eleventh amendment.
See United States v. Mississippi, 308 U.S. 128, 140 (1965); Parden v. Terminal RR., 377 U.S.
184, 192 (1964); Duhne v. New Jersey, 251 U.S. 311 (1920); Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 150
(1908); North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U.S. 22 (1890).
6. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I (1824). For a recent reaffirmance of congressional power under the
commerce clause and a review of past decisions see Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
7. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)at 21.
8. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940); Gilman v. Philadelphia,
70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865).
9. Interstate Commerce Act, 12 Stat. 489 (1866).
10. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964); Fair-Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C. § 201 (1964). NLRBv. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1936).
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utilities," economy,' 2 welfare,' 3 and civil rights.'4 In Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri
Commission, 5 Parden v. Terminal R.R.,' t and Maryland v. Wirtz, 17 the
commerce clause was held to allow federal intrusion into activities conducted
by the states themselves.
In Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Commission"s the Supreme Court resolved
a challenge to state sovereignty. Tennessee and Missouri had agreed to build
a bridge over and operate ferries across the Mississippi River. The suit arose
under the Jones Act' 9 when plaintiff, a widow, sought compensation for the
death of her husband who was killed while operating the defendant's ferry, part
of a state owned transportation facility. The compact between Tennessee and
Missouri required congressional approval and in granting their approval,
Congress attached a proviso that the terms of the compact would not be
interpreted "to affect, impair, or diminish any right, power, or jurisdiction of
• . .any court . ..of the United States over or in regard to any navigable
waters or any commerce between the States .... ."20 In Petty the Supreme
Court held that the two states had waived their immunity to suit. Mr. Justice
Douglas stated:
The States who are parties to the compact by accepting it and acting
under it assume the conditions that Congress under the Constitution
attached. So if there be doubt as to the meaning of the sue-and-
be-sued clause . . . . the doubt dissipates when the condition
attached by Congress is accepted and acted upon by the two States.'
The Petty decision represents a departure from previous Supreme Court deci-
sions2 and is the leading case recognizing the waiver of states immunity to suit
in federal court through congressional approval or regulation of activities by
the states.?
I1. Public Utilities Comm'n v. Attleboro Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. V, 1970).
13. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7 (1964).
14. 42 U.S.C. 2000a (1964).
15. 359 U.S. 275 (1959).
16. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
17. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
18. 359 U.S. 275 (1959).
19. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
20. 359 U.S. at 281.
21. Id.
22. The traditional approach to waiver of immunity to suit had been restrictive. Consent to
suit "could only be warranted if exacted by the most express language or by such overwhelming
implication from the text as would leave no room for any other reasonable construction." Murray
v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 172 (1909).
23. Other recent examples of cases involving waiver of state immunity to suit under the Jones
Act include: Chesapeake Bay Bridge and Tunnel Dist. v. Lauritzen, 404 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1968);
Huckins v. Bd. of Regents, 263 F. Supp. 622 (E.D. Mich. 1967); Cocherl v. Alaska, 246 F. Supp.
328 (D. Alas. 1965).
19711
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The Supreme Court struck another blow at state sovereignty in Parden v.
Terminal R.R. 2' The Court held that when the State of Alabama began
operation of a railroad, which directly and substantially affected interstate
commerce, 20 years after the enactment of the Federal Employees Liability
Act (FELA),25 it necessarily consented to such suits as were authorized by that
Act. An employee of a railroad owned by Alabama sought damages for
personal injuries under FELA. Here, for the first time in the Supreme Court,
a state's claim of immunity against suit by an individual met a suit brought
upon a cause of action expressly created by Congress.2" This raised two
questions: (I) did Congress intend to subject the state to suit? (2) did it have
the power to do so in light of the state's claim of sovereign immunity? Mr.
Justice Brennan answered both questions in the affirmative:
By adopting and ratifying the Commerce Clause, the states
empowered Congress to create such a right of Action against
interstate railroads; by enacting the FELA in the exercise of this
power, Congress conditioned the right to operate a railroad in
interstate commerce upon amenability to suit in federal court as
provided by the act; by thereafter operating a railroad in interstate
commerce, Alabama must be taken to have consented to suit. [Bly
engaging in interstate commerce by rail, [the state] has subjected
itself to the commerce power, and is liable for a violation of the
.. .Act, as are other carriers .... 21
Parden reiterated the principle that state sovereignty must yield to con-
gressional action founded upon constitutional powers.18 The Court further
stated: "By empowering Congress to regulate commerce, then, the States
necessarily surrendered any portion of their sovereignty that would stand in
the way of such regulation.12 9 The Court recognized that: "States have entered
and are entering numerous forms of activity which, if carried on by a private
person or corporation, would be subject to federal regulation. ' 30 Applying the
immunity provided by the eleventh amendment to these federal regulations
would lead to the natural result that where states are employers, the states'
employees would find themselves with "a right without a remedy."' 3'
The majority in Parden was careful to explain that it was not overriding
24. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
25. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1964).
26. 377 U.S. at 187.
27. Id. at 192-193.
28. E.g., New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1945); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
S1 (1942); Bd. of Trustees v. United States, 289 U.S. 48 (1933); Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v.
United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925).
29. 377 U.S. at 192.
30. Id. at 197.
31. Id. at 190.
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the eleventh amendment by virtue of any superiority of the commerce power.
On this point the court stated:
Recognition of the Congressional power to render a state sueable
under FELA does not mean that the immunity doctrine, as
embodied in the eleventh amendment with respect to citizens of other
states and as extended to the states' own citizens by the Hans case,
is here being overridden. It remains the law that a state may not
be sued by an individual without its consent. Our conclusion is
simply that Alabama, when it began operation of an interstate
railroad approximately 20 years after enactment of the FELA,
necessarily consented to such suit as was authorized by that act.32
Thus, the commerce power could be exercised in harmony with the eleventh
amendment, while at the same time subjecting the states to federal court suit.
The power of Congress to act under the commerce clause was given one of
its broadest interpretations in Maryland v. Wirtz. 31 In that case, 27 states as
plaintiffs sought to enjoin enforcement of the 1966 amendments to the Fair
Labor Standards Act(FLSA). 3 ' The plaintiffs contended that their inclusion
in the definition of employer exceeded the bounds of congressional power under
the commerce clause. Congress in 1961 had extended the coverage of FLSA
to any employee who "engaged in commerce or in the production of goods
for commerce."31 The "enterprise concept" expanded the Act to cover any
fellow employee of an employee who was covered under the original Act. The
1966 amendments to the Act removed the states' exemptions as employers, and
subjected them to suit under the Act's remedial provisions. 3 In Wirtz the Court
held that these amendments were not an unconstitutional extension of con-
gressional commerce power and noted that since states are major importers of
goods, a labor dispute might have a serious effect on interstate commerce.
An additional issue addressed in Maryland v. Wirtz was whether the com-
32. Id. at 192.
33. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 203 (Supp. V, 1970). The constitutionality of FLSA was, upheld in United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941). The court in upholding the Act said:
[T]o make effective the Congressional conception of public policy that interstate
commerce should not be made the instrument of competition in the distribution of goods
produced under substandard labor conditions, which competition is injurious to the
commerce and to the states from and to which the commerce flows.
The Congress in expanding the Act in 1971 was attempting to implement this national policy.
35. 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(4) (Supp. IV, 1966). Prior to 1966 the FLSA, like the federal statutes
in the cases discussed supra, applied only to activities engaged in by the private sector. The 1966
amendments mark the first time that legislation was directed toward what is primarily a state
activity, i.e., education and hospital facilities. These amendments could be read as a direct
congressional attempt to undermine state sovereignty.
36. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (Supp. IV, 1969).
1971]
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merce clause gave Congress the right to impose regulations on pre-existing
state functions; that is, activities undertaken by the states before there were
any federal regulations governing them. Discussing this issue the Court said:
If a State is engaging in economic activities that are validly regu-
lated by the Federal Government when engaged in by private
persons, the State too may be forced to conform its activities to
federal regulation.
3 7
The Court also indicated it would continue to examine congressional enact-
ments to ensure that there was a "rational basis" for including such regula-
tions under the commerce clause. However, businesses carried on by the state
for the "benefit of their citizens" if undistinguished from private business would
still be subject to congressional action.
3
1
The question of sovereign immunity was also raised in Maryland v. Wirtz.
The states objected to the creation of a remedy imposed upon them as a
condition of continued operation in an essential service area. In refusing to
pass upon the immunity question Mr. Justice Harlan said:
[W]e decline to be drawn into an abstract discussion of the
numerous complex issues that might arise in connection with the
Act's various remedial provisions. They are almost impossible and
most unnecessary to resolve in advance of particular facts, stated
claims, and identified plaintiffs and defendants. Questions of state
immunity are therefore reserved for appropriate future cases.39
The particular facts, stated claims, and identified plaintiffs and defendants
that Mr. Justice Harlan found absent in Wirtz were presented to the Supreme
Court in Briggs v. Saggers. 0 The Court, however, denied certiorari. 4
In Briggs, employees of a State of Utah-owned mental institution brought
suit in federal district court to recover unpaid overtime compensation and an
equal amount of liquidated damages. The basis for their suit was "the 1966
amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) which effectively
extended the minimum wage and maximum hours provisions to the
complaining workers .... ."4 Prior to the 1966 amendments, states as
"employers" had been specifically exempted from FLSA. The remedies
37. 392 U.S. at 197.
38. Id. at 200.
39. Id. (emphasis added).
40. 424 F.2d 130 (10th Cir.), ceri. denied, 400 U.S. 829 (1970).
41. 400 U.S. 829 (1970). This question may yet be presented to the. Supreme Court. Employees
of the State of Missouri v. Missouri, __ F.2d - (8th Cir. 1971) contained virtually identical
facts and issues as Briggs. The Eighth Circuit relied on Parden and Briggs in holding, two to one,
for the employees. An application for an appellate court en banc hearing has been made. See page
172.
42. 424 F.2d at 131 (10th Cir. 1970).
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provided by FLSA include the right to sue in federal courts. The state defended
on two grounds: first, that the district court lacked jurisdiction due to Utah's
sovereign immunity under the eleventh amendment; and secondly, that the
principle of a state's implied consent to suit as found in Parden was not
applicable. The United States District Court for the Central District of Utah
dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction.43 In a short opinion the court accepted
both of the states contentions. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed." The
appellate court held that Utah had waived its eleventh amendment immunity
to suit by continuing to operate the training school after the effective date of
the 1966 FLSA amendments. The court, relying on Parden, stated "that with
regard to sovereign immunity, waiver of a constitutional privilege need be
neither knowing nor intelligent." 45 The defendant state attempted to distinguish
Parden on its facts, i.e., the Utah-owned training school was a pre-existing
state activity when the 1966 amendments to the FLSA became effective,
whereas in Parden, the state activity had commenced 20 years after passage
of the applicable legislation. The court clearly rejected Utah's attempt to
distinguish Parden.
While finding that the Parden decision was applicable to the factual situation
in Briggs, the court's holding went beyond that of Parden. Parden and Briggs
each arose under a congressionally created cause of action founded upon the
commerce clause. 6 In Briggs the Tenth Circuit faced "[t]he inevitable con-
frontation [which] squares the power of Congress to regulate interstate com-
merce under the commerce clause against the Eleventh Amendment right of
the states to be free from federal court suit, absent consent." 47 Although not
expressly stated, the court's holding indicated that this confrontation was re-
solved in favor of the power of Congress to regulate commerce.
In Briggs the question was not whether Congress, under its commerce power,
can regulate state owned facilities. The Supreme Court in Maryland v. Wirtz
clearly decided it could. Rather the question was whether Congress can nullify
the states' sovereign immunity protection under the eleventh amendment by
creating a private cause of action, and do so with respect to a pre-existing and
necessary state activity.
Deciding Briggs as it did, the Tenth Circuit has indicated that claims of
invasion of state sovereignty are no longer an obstacle to federal legislation.
Congress, acting under the commerce power may regulate activities considered
43. 301 F. Supp. 1023 (D. Utah 1969).
44. 424 F.2d 130 (10th Cir. 1970).
45. Id. at 134.
46. Parden involved the Federal Employees Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1964),
and Briggs the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1964).
47. 424 F.2d at 131-32.
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essential by the states and federal regulations may be imposed on areas of state
activity presently in existence, as well as future fields of state activities.
In the Ninety-second Congress legislation"8 has been introduced to create a
public employee counterpart to the National Labor Relations Act.49 The bills,
founded upon the power of Congress to regulate commerce, would create in
public employees "the rights to which all employees working in a free,
democratic society are entitled." 5 0 Rights specified in the proposed bill include
the right to organize and bargain collectively. Except for a few appointed or
elected officials, the provisions of the act would extend to all persons working
for a state, county, city or any political subdivision thereof. For example, this
far reaching legislation would include: state fish and game commission
employees, county road crews, and city sanitation workers. Like the Jones Act
and the FLSA, relief under the proposed act is to be provided by federal courts.
This proposed legislation is unique. Previously, states were subjected to
federal regulation when engaging in "activity, which if carried on by a private
person or corporation, would be subject to federal regulation." 5' This
legislation would effect state government on all levels, not just regulation of
business-like "activities," but into the heart of state government itself, could
only have been proposed after the series of court precedents discussed supra.
The relief granted would not be available without the court's subrogation of
the states' eleventh amendment protection to the power of the federal
government.
How far can Congress go in the regulation of state activities on the basis
of the commerce clause? Today there is virtually no area of activity which is
not touched in some way by interstate commerce.52 Exceptionally broad
authority has been permitted Congress through court decision, and state
immunity previously considered protected by the eleventh amendment has
yielded to congressional action. Congress may be expected to continue to
legislate under the authority of its commerce power. However, the broad powers
given to the federal government by the decisions in Petty, Parden, Wirtz, and
Briggs must ultimately be balanced against the current concept of "federal-
48. H.R. 7684, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971). This bill was introduced with over 50 sponsors.
49. 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1964). Among other things, the National Labor Relations Act
gives employees the right to organize and bargain collectively and to be free from court injunction
against strikes.
50. H.R. 7684, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § - (1971); H.R. 19226, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § -
(1971).
51. Parden v. Terminal R.R., 377 U.S. 184, 197 (1964). For other cases that a state, when
engaged in activities affecting interstate commerce may be held subject to federal regulation see:
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968); California v. United States, 320 U.S. 577 (1944); United
States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936); Bd. of Trustees v. United States, 289 U.S. 48 (1933).
52. See notes 6-13 supra. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. I 11 (1942).
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ism." The Supreme Court discussed the "federalism" issue in Wirtz;5 3 how-
ever, the presently constituted Court may have a more traditional view of that
concept.54
Observations and Conclusions
In a constitutional context, state sovereignty, as embodied in the eleventh
amendment, cannot be considered a limitation on the commerce clause.
Immunity comes from the eleventh amendment. Waiver of that immunity may
be express, or may result from necessary implication through the exercise of
commerce power. As Parden indicated, the two constitutional provisions are
capable of being read and applied in a harmonious fashion.
The Briggs case presented a direct confrontation between the eleventh
amendment and the power of Congress to regulate commerce. From that
decision we can infer that the commerce power may be said to prevail because
it is superior in nature to the sovereign immunity principle." States must be
deemed subordinate in terms of their susceptibility to federal regulation and
to federal court suit when necessary to implement such regulation. When a
state receives the benefit of a federal statute, it must accept any burden that
the law may impose. As the Supreme Court said in Parden, the states
necessarily "surrendered a portion of their sovereignty when they granted
Congress the power to regulate commerce.""
"When Congress constitutionally hinges the right of a state to engage in
interstate commerce [sic] upon its amenability to a federal court suit by private
parties, the States must decide eo instante whether to continue or withdraw."'
53. 392 U.S. at 201.
54. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). There the defendant sought in federal court
to enjoin the state district attorney from prosecution under the California Criminal Syndicalism
Act. In a context different from that presented in the series of cases leading to Briggs, the court
(per Black, J.) stated:
[Ain even more vital consideration (is] the notion of "comity," that is, a proper respect
for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a
Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National
Government will fare best if the States in their institutions are left free to perform their
separate functions in their separate ways . . . . [Aind one familiar with the profound
debates that ushered our Federal Constitution into existence is bound to respect those
who remain loyal to the ideals and dreams of "Our Federalism!"
401 U.S. at 44.
55. Alternative arguments for placing the commerce clause in a superior position to the eleventh
amendment in the Briggs case might be that the commerce power must prevail in any such federal-
state confrontation, and, that the eleventh amendment is the weaker of the two provisions, relying
as it does upon court extension (Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)) to make it applicable to
suits against a state by its own citizens.
56. 377 U.S. at 191.
57. Briggs v. Sagers, 424 F.2d 130, 134 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 829 (1970).
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Any activity conducted after the effective date of the legislation in question
subjects the state to the remedial provisions of the enactment. If withdrawal
from the regulated state activity is precluded by the state's own constitution,
it appears that the state would have no choice but to "consent" to suit. 8
As Briggs implied, states must rely on Congress to consider their interests.
In contemplating legislation founded upon the commerce power the Congress
must balance the states' interests against national priorities. It is for Congress
to determine that the scope of proposed legislation has a "rational basis" under
the commerce clause and that the need for federal regulation is of greater
importance than any resultant hardship imposed upon the states. States, like
private employers, must accept any financial burden resulting under the
remedial provisions of federal legislation.
Petty, Parden, Wirtz, and Briggs indicate that states can be subjected to
private causes of action. Waiver of state's constitutional immunity need not
be affirmatively made, but may be implied from state operation of activities
in an area of federal regulation. The commerce clause has provided the basis
for increasing federal domination. Taking into account current federal-state
relationships, the courts have, sub silentio, placed the commerce clause in a
position superior to the eleventh amendment.*
Paul M. Blayney
James B. Kenin
58. The involved and timely procedures of amending a state constitution and disentanglement
from pre-existing activity would often make impossible the state's withdrawal prior to the effective
date of a federal statute.
* The Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, recently reversed its earlier decision. State of Missouri v.
Missouri, No. 20,204 (8th Cir., Nov. 11, 1971). The Missouri case and Briggs now present a con-
flict between the Eighth and Tenth Circuits on identical issues. An application for certiorari is
planned. The five to four majority of the Eighth Circuit distinguished the case before it from
Parden on four grounds, all of which have been discussed herein. The majority failed to mention
Briggs. The only new reasoning given for the full panels decision was that the eleventh amendment
should prevail over the commerce clause "as the most recent expression of the will of the people."
The court's application of this rule of construction is misplaced. The rule has use in construing
statutes or international legal doctrines which are created subsequent to a constitution. But a con-
stitution and its amendments are an integrated whole with no one provision having more force than
any other. Where two constitutional provisions conflict, as in the Briggs and Missouri cases, a court
must select one as controlling on the basis of the factual and legal issues presented in light of the
policy and goals sought to be furthered by the provisions.
